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INTRODUCTION
This article argues that the Supreme Court of the United States is sys-
tematically destroying the principal jurisprudential foundations of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Several recent Rehnquist and Roberts Courts decisions
regarding the Commerce Clause reflect a judicial interpretive approach de-
cried by Thomas Jefferson nearly two hundred years ago. In a Christmas
letter to Thomas Ritchie, Jefferson contended that the prime threat to the
fabric of the Constitution would not come from the Congress because:
"Taxes and short elections will keep them right."1 Rather Jefferson declared
that:
The judiciary of the United States is the subtle corps of sappers and miners
constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our
confederated fabric. They are construing our constitution from a co-ordination
of a general and special government to a general and supreme one alone. This
will lay all things at their feet, and they are too well versed in English law to
forget the maxim, "boni judicis est ampliare juris-dictionem." We shall see if
they are bold enough to take the daring stride their five lawyers have lately tak-
en. 2
Jefferson's letter came in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision
in McCulloch v. Maryland, which upheld Congress's authority to create a
national bank based on what Jefferson perceived as a broad and erroneous
interpretation of congressional power to enact legislation that was "neces-
sary and proper."3 Jefferson viewed the United States of America as a "con-
federated fabric" - essentially a union comprised of semi-autonomous state
governments.4 He feared a federal judiciary that did not appropriately re-
spect the authority of state governments. A powerful federal government
would have the authority to interfere with state and local practices and insti-
tutions - like slavery.
This article contends that the present Court's narrow interpretation of
Congress' power pursuant to the Commerce Clause is a contemporary ex-
ample of judicial erosion of the constitutional foundations protecting the
rights of all Americans. The constitutional analysis employed by the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts particularly threatens the exercise of rights of
those who have historically been oppressed because of skin color and gen-
der.
1Id.
2 Id. (emphasis added)
'See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 323-24 (1819).
4 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie, supra note 1, at 177.
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The impetus for this assertion flows in part from the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
(hereafter the ACA case).' In a five to four decision, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care
Act as a tax; but by an equally slim margin declared that the Constitution
did not confer authority upon Congress to enact the mandate under the
Commerce Clause.6 This is potentially a significant development because
the primary constitutional pillar of the Civil Rights Act is Congress' com-
merce power. In addressing non-discrimination in public accommodations,
Title Two implicates the commerce power ' as does Title Seven which pro-
scribes employment discrimination.8 If the limits of Congress' commerce
power are narrowly confined, the legal foundations for these core provi-
sions of the Act could be greatly compromised. Everyone in the United
States could be affected because Titles Two and Seven protect individuals
from discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion and national
origin.9
In these circumstances, one might reformulate Jefferson's fears in the
following way. As illustrated by the ACA case, the Roberts Court is behav-
ing like a "subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under
ground to undermine the foundations" of human rights protections provided
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. "We shall see if they are bold enough to
take the daring stride their five lawyers have lately taken."1
In support of this overall thesis, this article is organized as follows. To
orient readers on what is at stake, Section I provides a brief overview of the
substantive provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section II considers
reasons why the Act was premised on Congress' Commerce Clause authori-
ty rather than the enforcement power that the Constitution confers upon
Congress under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Section III
evaluates several recent Supreme Court decisions that give the Commerce
Clause a restrictive interpretation. For illustrative purposes, this section ex-
plores the impact on Title Two of the Act. Finally, the article closes with a
s Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
6 id.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accom-
modation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin.").
' § 2000e(b) ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year").
See § 2000a(a); § 2000e-2(a).
'" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie, supra note 1, at 177.
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few observations of the implications of the Roberts' Court jurisprudential
approach in the ACA case.
I. A PRtCJS OF WHAT THE CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 ADDRESSES
When the Act was proposed, debate ensued regarding the proper consti-
tutional basis for the Act. Some persons argued that the proper constitution-
al foundation for the Act was the Reconstruction Amendments - specifical-
ly the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.1 Others
contended that the Commerce Clause provided a more secure basis because
of the Court's prior virtual asphyxiation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
For reasons discussed in more detail in Section II, most proponents of the
Act asserted that the primary - though not exclusive - foundation of the Act
was the Commerce Clause.13 On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson
signed the Civil Rights Act into law.14
As originally enacted, the Act was comprised of eleven titles. Title One
of the Civil Rights Act enhanced access to the ballot for African Americans
and other excluded groups by providing for use of a more uniform standard
for determining who could vote in federal elections.15 This provision helped
to undercut notorious tactics of racist local voting registrars who were
known to determine the eligibility of African Americans voters by asking
questions like "Explain the Shipping Bill of the United States" whereas il-
literate white voters might be asked "In Virginia, can white and colored
children go to school together?"16
Title Two of the Act outlawed "discrimination or segregation on the
grounds of race, color, religion or national origin" in "any place of public
accommodation." 1 Title Two contributed to the demise of pervasive"white" and "colored" signs separating patrons of public accommodations
" GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 203 (10th ed. 1980) (Gunther argued strenuously that the
Act should be premised on the Fourteenth Amendment as the "obviously most relevant source of nation-
al power.").
12 The Equal Protection Clause was "[v]ritually strangled in its infancy" by the Court. See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J., quoting Joseph Tussman & Jacobus
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341,381 (1949)).
'" GUNTHER, supra note 11 at 198-203 (excerpt of Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Com-
merce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.)
'" Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/black-history-month/the-civil-rights-act-of-
1964 (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
15 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (2012).
16 THOMAS C. WALKER, THE HONEYPOD TREE: THE LIFE STORY OF THOMAS C. WALKER 177 (1958).
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012).
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like hotels and restaurants as well as fences dividing amusement parks and
out-door theatres.
Title Three of the Civil Rights Act provided that where certain condi-
tions have been met, the Attorney General may bring a federal law suit to
protect an individual who claims a violation of her right to equal protection
of the laws. Specifically, Congress required that the Attorney General must
receive a written complaint signed by an individual alleging deprivation of
equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, or national
origin; and that such discrimination involved public facilities owned, oper-
ated, or managed by a state or subdivision of a state other than a public
school or a public college.18 Additionally, the Act mandated that the Attor-
ney General must believe that the claimants have a meritorious basis for a
lawsuit.19 Moreover, the Act required the Attorney General to certify that
claimants are unable to maintain appropriate legal proceedings for relief. In
addition, the Attorney General had to certify that the suit would materially
further the orderly process of desegregation in public facilities. 2 Title Four
of the Act helped to undercut segregation in public educational institutions
from primary through post-secondary levels. Among other things, Title
Four authorized the Attorney General to bring civil suits to ensure equal
protection of educational opportunities for individuals who the Attorney
General certified had meritorious claims and who were unable to initiate
and maintain civil actions to vindicate such claims.2 The Act also required
the Attorney General to certify that the suit would "materially further the
orderly achievement of desegregation in public education.1 22
Title Five of the Civil Rights Act addresses procedures for the Civil
Rights Commission, a statutory body the Civil Rights Act of 1957 created.
The Civil Rights Commission has the authority to investigate and make re-
ports regarding claims of civil rights violations.24 Under Title Five's "Rules
of Procedure for [Civil Rights] Commission Hearings", any person who is
compelled to appear before the Commission in person is entitled to have
counsel to accompany and advise her.25 Counsel may subject such a witness
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(a) (2012).
'9 Id.
20 Id.
21 § 2000c-6(a).
22 Id.
23 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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to reasonable examination and to make objections on the record on behalf
of the witness.26
Title Six expanded protection against race discrimination by forbidding
any program receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating on
the basis of race, color or national origin. For examples, colleges and uni-
versities who receive federal funds were confronted with the choice of ad-
mitting students on a non-racially discriminatory basis or losing such
funds.
In the workplace, Title Seven of the Act provided protections for equal
employment opportunities. Such protections included prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin in em-
ployment hiring, promotion or firing decisions. 28 Thus Title Seven helped to
open avenues for women and persons of color to obtain supervisory as well
as other better paying positions that had historically been denied to them
because of gender or race.29 Title Seven also created the Equal Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) whose functions include investigating and attempting
to informally resolve complaints of unlawful employment practices. 'o
Title Eight of the Act required the Secretary of Commerce to provide da-
ta regarding the demographic profile of voters since 1960 in areas designat-
ed by the Civil Rights Commission.3 1 Title Eight stated that no one was
compelled to disclose information about his or her race.32
Title Nine allowed the Attorney General to intervene in any court case
involving Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims which the Attor-
ney General deemed to be of public importance.33 Among other things, Title
Ten of the Act established a Community Relations Services led by a direc-
tor appointed by the President for a term of four years with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 4 The Community Relations Service was designed to
"provide assistance to communities and persons therein and resolve dis-
putes, disagreements, or difficulties relating to discriminatory practices
based on race, color, or national origin which impair the rights of persons in
such communities under the Constitution or laws of the United States or
26 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,249.
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012).
28 § 2000e-2(a).
29 See § 2000e.
o See id.
31 § 2000f.
32 Id.
33 § 2000h-2.
34 § 2000g.
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which affect or may affect interstate commerce. 35 Furthermore, Title Ten
provided that the officers and employees of the Community Relations Ser-
vice must conduct their conciliation efforts without publicity and hold con-
fidential "any information acquired in the regular performance of its duties
upon the understanding that it would be so held."36
Title Eleven dealt with miscellaneous matters like "punishment for crim-
inal contempt arising under title two, three, four, five, six, or seven."3 Title
Eleven limited punishment under the Civil Rights Act for criminal con-
tempt citations to fines of not more than a thousand dollars or imprisonment
of not more than six months. 8
We now turn to Section II, which furnishes a brief review of American
constitutional history regarding the protection of the human rights of people
of color. This synopsis may illuminate why the Commerce Clause was cho-
sen as the appropriate constitutional bulwark upon which to base the Act.
Such a review may also facilitate understanding why the Court's restrictive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause is so ominous.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY: HOW THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BECAME AN
AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS GAP-FILLER39
A. Dred Scott
In the Dred Scott decision, Chief Justice Taney furnished a substantially
accurate (though disconcerting) historical summary of the legal status of
African Americans in much of the United States from colonial times to the
advent of the Civil War. Chief Justice Taney stated:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white
man was bound to respect; and that the Negro might justly and lawfully be re-
duced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an or-
dinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by
it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of
the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics,
§ 2000g-1.
36 § 2000g-2.
17 § 2000h.
38 id.
31 This section is largely based upon an unpublished manuscript: Oliver W. Hill & Jonathan K. Stubbs,
Denial or Rebirth? Essays on Justice in America (forthcoming 2015) (on file with University of Rich-
mond Journal of Law and the Public Interest).
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which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men
in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their
private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting for a
moment the correctness of this opinion. 40
Dred Scott granted legal approval to prevailing American social custom
and practice: under the law African Americans had no rights and therefore
could be beaten, raped, dismembered, and even murdered with impunity.
Slavery legalized violence and deeply entrenched it as an unseemly Ameri-
can heritage.
Aside from sanctioning legal barbarism, the Dred Scott Court decided an
explosive constitutional matter that was not before the Court. By a mere
"side wind," the Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise and opened all
of America's territories to slavery.4 ' Even though the prospect of slavery
overrunning the West threatened to split the Union, rather than demonstrat-
ing judicial restraint, the Court invaded Congress' authority to govern
American territories. In doing so, the Dred Scott majority upset the Consti-
tution's balance of power between the three governmental branches. 42
Specifically, the Court could have recognized and respected Congress'
role as a co-equal branch of government. As a legislative institution, Con-
gress was attempting to forge a political compromise of a hotly disputed na-
tional issue - the expansion of slavery into western territories. Rather than
upholding Congress' constitutional competence (and duty) to resolve na-
tional political disputes, the Court boldly sided with slaveholders and in do-
ing so, stirred a political hornet's nest. 43
" Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
41 See id. at 452.
42 See generally 2 JOHN ASHWORTH, SLAVERY, CAPITALISM, AND POLITICS IN THE ANTEBELLUM
REPUBLIC: THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1850-1861, at 321 (2007) ("In the 1850s there
had been a violent attempt to extend slavery into Kansas and a spate of filibustering expeditions into
Latin America, some of them with the covert or open support of prominent Democrats. Leading Demo-
crats north and south had sought to obtain Cuba and in 1860 both wings of the democratic party had of-
ficially committed themselves to the acquisition of additional territory"); DAVID M. POTTER, THE
IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 396 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976) (describing various attempts to
get legislatures in southern states to re-implement the slave trade. "the state legislature in 1857-1859
rejected a series of attempts to bring the issue to a vote, as did the Texas legislature in 1857 ... the high
tide of the effort to secure legislation came in March 1858, when the Louisiana House of Representa-
tives voted 46 to 21 to authorize the importation into Louisiana of 'twenty-five hundred free Africans' as
apprentices"); DOUGLAS CHARLES STANGE, BRITISH UNITARIANS AGAINST AMERICAN SLAVERY 1833-
1865, at 155 (1984) (stating that following the Dred Scott decision "[t]he Southern oligarchy controlled
the entire machinery of the United States government. It had its eyes on Latin America and contemplat-
ed the formation of a 'vast Slave-Empire"').
41 See Scott, 60 U.S. at 452. In response, Frederick Douglass, a leading human rights advocate and abo-
litionist argued that the Constitution had not used the term slave or slavery, and therefore should be con-
strued to favor freedom rather than oppression. In a memorable address delivered on March 26, 1860, in
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The Dred Scott Court essentially held that African Americans were non-
human beings and helped to propel America towards the cataclysm of civil
war.
A precarious military situation during the ensuing conflict impelled Pres-
ident Abraham Lincoln to take a decisive military measure: In the Emanci-
pation Proclamation, President Lincoln declared that all persons held as
slaves in areas of the nation that were "in rebellion" were "thenceforward,
and forever free."44 While important in undercutting the rebels' war efforts,
Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was only effective in freeing slaves in
portions of slaveholding areas which were fighting against the central gov-
ernment.45
As the War drew to a close, a significant legal issue haunted the United
States: what was the status of the newly freed slaves? To resolve the legal
status of the recently freed persons, on December 6, 1865, the United States
adopted the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution.46 In relevant part,
the Thirteenth Amendment states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States."147
Following the conclusion of the War, many former confederates regained
power in southern state and local governments. 48 The ex-confederate led
state governments recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment allowed
them to impose involuntary servitude upon a duly convicted criminal.49
Glasgow, Scotland, Douglass described persons who favored a proslavery interpretation of the Constitu-
tion in these words: "They are in the habit of treating the Negro as an exception to general rules. When
their own liberty is in question they will avail themselves of all rules of law which protect and defend
their freedom; but when the black man's rights are in question they concede everything, admit every-
thing for slavery, and put liberty to the proof. They reverse the common law usage, and presume the
Negro a slave unless he can prove himself free. I, on the other hand, presume him free unless he is
proved to be otherwise." FREDERICK DOUGLASS, SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 380, 387 (Philip
S. Foner ed. 1999).
4" The Emancipation Proclamation, U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.go
v/exhibits/featured documents/emancipation proclamation/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
45 PETER N. CARROLL & DAVID W. NOBLE, THE FREE AND THE UNFREE: A PROGRESSIVE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 217 (3d rev. ed. 2001); 2 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE: 1789 THROUGH RECONSTRUCTION 435 (1972).
46 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Abolition of Slavery (1865), OUR DOCUMENTS, http://www
.ourdocuments.gov/print friendly.php?page=&doc=40&title= 13th+Amendment+to+the+U. S.+Constitut
ion%3A+Abolition+of+Slavery+%281865%29 (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).41 U.S. CONST. amend. X111, § 1.
48 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1867, at 188 (1988).
Back Story With The History Guys, 1865: United States of Uncertainty (broadcast April 24, 2015,
available at http://backstoryradio.org/shows/eighteen-sixty-five/)41 U.S. CONST. amend. X111, § 1.
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The former confederates interpreted and applied the Amendment to virtu-
ally re-enslave former slaves who were convicted of crimes.
For example, Southern legislatures passed broad and vague state vagran-
cy statutes which essentially made being unemployed a crime. 51 According-
ly, a jobless ex-slave could be convicted, imprisoned, placed on a chain
gang and compelled to work for free on the local plantation at which he had
been previously held captive. 2
Likewise, the former Confederates enacted state laws commonly called
"Black Codes, '53 which (among other things) prohibited African Americans
from sitting on juries, owning or leasing land, making contracts and work-
ing in lucrative trades. These statutes demonstrated that the ex-rebels con-
tinued to oppose equality for the former slaves, and remained determined to
continue slavery to the maximum extent possible. 4
During the fall of 1865, as southern states sought to regain representation
in the Congress, the elections throughout the South allowed many persons
like former confederate vice president Alexander Stephens to be elected to
Congress and represent the southern states.
Many sitting Congressmen were opposed to the election of former con-
federate civilian and military leaders to Congress, only a few months after
the cessation of hostilities that had resulted in the deaths of a half million
Americans. Seeking to safeguard basic human rights, Congress refused to
seat the newly elected southern congressman.5 6
Instead, Congress passed corrective legislation: the Civil Rights Act of
1866. 5 The Act provided that American citizens of
every race and color . . . shall have the same right [throughout the United
States] to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws ... for the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens.58
51 See FONER, supra note 48, at 199; RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT, at 27-29 (2004).
5' FONER, supra note 48, at 199-200.
52 See N. Gordon Carper, Slavery Revisited: Peonage in the South, 37 PHYLON 85, 85-86 (1976).
5' FONER, supra note 48, at 199.
54 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1872); FONER, supra note 48, at 199.
55 FONER, supra note 48, at 196.
56 FONER, supra note 48, at 239; Valelly, supra note 50 at 29.
51 14 Star. 27, 27-30 (1866).
58 14 Star. 27, 27 (1866).
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The Act basically said that all American citizens would have the same
civil rights as white persons. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill, ar-
guing that it constituted discrimination against whites and centralized too
much power in the federal government. 9 Congress overrode the presiden-
tial veto.60 However, enforcement of the Act was erratic and often ineffi-
cient. 1
In the congressional elections of 1866, voters installed a majority of pro-
gressive, Republican congressmen. 62 These individuals continued the land-
mark legal change following the war, including the drafting of the Four-
teenth Amendment.6 3 When the United States ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, it conferred citizenship upon all people born or natu-
ralized in the United States, including former slaves. 64 The Fourteenth
Amendment overturned the Dred Scott decision, and recognized that former
slaves had equal political and civil rights with other members of society; it
created a legal foundation for a new civil society based on equality.
Both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments expressly authorized
Congress to enforce each Amendment "by appropriate legislation." 65 Given
the historical context in which these two Amendments were ratified why
would The Civil Rights Act of 1964 not have been "appropriate legisla-
tion"? In fact the Act sought to eliminate racial segregation - a direct legal
descendant of slavery. Had the Court properly interpreted the Constitution
during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Congress could have based
the Act on the explicit constitutional texts of the Amendments. However,
that is not the story that unfolded.
5' FONER, supra note 48, at 250; see Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (March 27,
1866) in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 405-06
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
6' FONER, supra note 48, at 250-51.
61 FONER, supra note 48, at 455.
62 FONER, supra note 48, at 267, 270-71.
63 FONER, supra note 48, at 251-52.
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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B. Undermining the New Birth of Freedom 66
The Slaughterhouse Cases 67 presented the first major constitutional test
of the scope of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Slaughter-
house Cases involved a Louisiana statute creating a monopoly for the
slaughter of animals in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. 6' Local butchers chal-
lenged the statute on the basis (among other things) that under the Four-
teenth Amendment, the state law infringed their "privileges or immunities"
to pursue their chosen vocation. 69 The Supreme Court spurned their claims.
Beginning with an historical analysis of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, the Supreme Court said:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in
them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them
would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the
security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the new-
ly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him.70
By stating that the Constitution safeguarded the rights of African Ameri-
cans, the Court took a giant step forward compared to Dred Scott, which
had said that African Americans had no rights that whites were bound to re-
spect.
Even though the Fourteenth Amendment made the former slaves citizens
of the national government, the Slaughterhouse Court contended that the
rights of citizens at the national level were extremely limited. For example,
national citizenship rights encompassed the right to petition the government
to change its policies, to have the assistance of the national government if
the citizen were in trouble on the high seas or with a foreign government
and to move freely from one state to another. 1
In contrast to the puny national citizenship rights, the Slaughterhouse
Court said that the states controlled most meaningful rights of citizenship,
66 See President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). "It is rather for us to be
here dedicated to the great task remaining before us -- that from these honored dead we take increased
devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion -- that we here highly re-
solve that these dead shall not have died in vain -- that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of
freedom -- and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the
earth." Id.
67 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
68 Id. at 38.
69 Id. at 43-44.
" Id. at 71.
71Id. at 79-80.
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including: making contracts, owning property and serving on juries. These
were all primarily matters under state supervision. Quoting Corfield v.
Coryell, the Slaughterhouse decision described the rights (or "privileges
and immunities") of state citizenship as being: "comprehended under the
following general heads: protection by the government, with the right to ac-
quire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happi-
ness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government
may prescribe for the general good of the whole." 2
In the Slaughterhouse decision, the Court firmly rejected the obvious
meaning of the Amendment: specifically, that the Constitution gave Con-
gress broad power to protect the former slaves from oppressive state action.
The majority asked:
Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the simple declaration that
no State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protec-
tion of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Fed-
eral government? And where it is declared that Congress shall have the power
to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress
the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the
States?
7 3
A reasonable answer to the Court's question would have been, "yes, of
course!" State law created slavery, perpetuated the accumulation of material
wealth and political power derived from slave labor, undermined and al-
most permanently destroyed national unity and attempted to recreate slav-
ery through Black codes. The privileges or immunities provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment aimed to protect former slaves by ensuring that as
citizens of the United States they would also have the same human rights as
white citizens in the State in which they lived. Thus, the Fourteenth
Amendment limited the ability of the states to oppress the former slaves.
Stated another way, the Amendment authorized Congress to protect human
rights by enacting appropriate legislation, especially where the State failed
to act or where the State became an instrument of majority tyranny.
The majority's miserly interpretation of human rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment conferred the primary protection of the human rights of
African Americans upon state governments, which were often dominated
by unrepentant former rebels. Basically, the Court placed the foxes firmly
in control of the chicken coop...
72 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 76.
" Id. at 77.
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The dissenters in Slaughterhouse recognized the Court's flawed analysis
and said:
A citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States residing in that
State. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him
as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the United
States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any State... They do not
derive their existence from its [the state's] legislation, and cannot be destroyed
by its power.74
Moreover, the dissenters pointed out that:
The amendment does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immunities
upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those already existing. It assumes that
there are such privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as
such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by State legislation. If this in-
hibition has no reference to privileges and immunities of this character, but on-
ly refers, as held by the majority of the court in their opinion, to such privileges
and immunities as were before its adoption specially designated in the Consti-
tution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it
was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnec-
essarily excited Congress and the people on its passage... But if the amendment
refers to the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the inhi-
bition has a profound significance and consequence. 75
The dissent's position would not only have furnished powerful protection
for former slaves but also it would have strengthened protection for the
rights of all working people (including the butchers in the Slaughterhouse
Cases). Such individuals would have been better able to freely pursue their
vocations.
On the same day as the Slaughterhouse decision butchered the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, in Bradwell v. Illinois, the Court added insult to inju-
ry: The Court denied women the right to practice law. In Bradwell, Myra
Bradwell, a woman living in Illinois, passed the Illinois bar exam with high
honors and was qualified to practice law. 76 The Illinois Supreme Court de-
nied Bradwell admission to the state bar. Bradwell sued alleging that her
privileges or immunities of citizenship included the freedom to practice law
74 Id. at 95-96.
75 Id. at 96.
76 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 130 (1873). See generally DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE 50 MOST
INFLUENTIAL WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 25 (1996); JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA'S FIRST WOMAN
LAWYER: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MYRA BRADWELL (1993); JILL NORGREN, REBELS AT THE BAR: THE
FASCINATING, FORGOTTEN STORIES OF AMERICA'S FIRST WOMEN LAWYERS 26-43 (2013).
77 Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 131.
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and that the state of Illinois violated her rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.8
The Court rejected Bradwell's argument and held that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause did not encompass a woman's right to practice law."9
The Slaughterhouse Court's narrow reading of privileges or immunities
made it easier for the Court in Bradwell to rebuff the argument that practic-
ing law was a privilege or immunity (right or liberty) of citizenship. The
Court seemed convinced that the freedom of choosing a vocation was not at
the core of American citizenship. To the extent that citizenship was relevant
to practicing law, the Court concluded that individual states could decide
the appropriate qualifications for admission to the state's bar.8" The practi-
cal result: the United States Supreme Court upheld the Illinois court's deci-
sion to exclude Bradwell from the legal profession because she was a wom-
an.
The Bradwell case exemplified a legal and social structure that obstruct-
ed women's entry into the legal profession. Indeed, from 1789-2008, every
American president appointed males to more than seventy percent (70%) of
federal judgeships.8 1 Prior to 2008, every president appointed white males
to a majority of such judgeships. President Barack Obama has appointed
women to over forty per cent of federal judgeships.8 2 Women of all colors
and men of color comprise the majority of Obama's judicial appointees.83
Following a brief period of relative calm, throughout the mid and late
1870s, white southern political, civic and religious leaders boldly pro-
claimed their continuing dedication to restoring "white supremacy." 84 Thus,
for instance, between 1873 and 1877, in Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama,
Georgia and both Carolinas, "Home Rule" or "Redeemer" governments
came to power facilitated by whips, bullets and stuffed ballot boxes.85 These
governments opposed the exercise by African Americans of rights like vot-
78 Id. at 133.
9 Id. at 139.
80 Id.
8 Jonathan K. Stubbs, A Demographic History of Federal Judicial Appointments, 1789-2015, 26
BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. (forthcoming 2016); Carl Tobias, Diversity and the Federal Bench, 87 WASH.
L. REV. 1197, 1203-07 (2010).
82 Neil Eggleston, Judicial Nominations: Accomplishments and the Work That Lies Ahead (Dec. 17,
2014, 3:39PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/12/17/udicial-nominations-accomplishments-a
nd-work-lies-ahead.
83 Id.
84 Michael Perman. Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888-1908, 107 THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 885, 885-86 (June 2002); White Supremacy and Terrorism, PBS, http:/
/www.pbs.org/tpt/slavery-by-another-name/themes/white-supremacy/ (last visited April 27, 2015).
85 FONER, supra note 48, at 587-88.
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ing, property ownership, and holding jobs other than manual labor.8 6 Many
whites viewed it as a threat for African Americans to enjoy the fruits of
their own labor as entrepreneurs. For example, after he, his wife and chil-
dren had been beaten by Ku Klux Klansmen, one African American man in
Florida, who was trying to purchase a parcel of land for his family, was told
that the Klan did not "allow damned niggers to live on land of their own".s
Realizing that something needed to be done, the Republican Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to safeguard human rights, especially
those of former slaves.88 The Act was comprehensive and sought to limit
discrimination against African Americans in public accommodations as
well as other spheres of American life.
In relevant part, Section 1 of the Act read as follows:
[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other
places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations es-
tablished by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, re-
gardless of any previous condition of servitude. 89
Section 2 of the Act made it a misdemeanor criminal offense to deprive a
person of the rights secured under Section 1.90
The Act was immediately challenged in federal court. Two cases in-
volved the denial of hotel accommodations to persons of color, 91 discrimi-
nation in theatres sparked two other cases, 92 and a final case encompassed
86 Unit 7 The Reconstruction Era, 1865-1877, N.J. STATE LIBRARY, http://www.njstatelib.org/research 1
ibrary/new-jersey resources/digital collection/unit 7 reconstruction era/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
87 FoNER, supra note 48, at 429.
88 Landmark Legislation: Civil Rights Act of 1875, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/h
istory/common/generic/CivilRightsAct 875.htm.
89 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9 (1883).
"[A]ny person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons
by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servi-
tude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said sec-
tion enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the
sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with
full costs; and shall also, for every such offence, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon convic-
tion thereof, shall be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be
imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year: Provided, That all persons may elect to sue
for the penalty aforesaid, or to proceed under their rights at common law and by State statutes; and hav-
ing so elected to proceed in the one mode or the other, their fight to proceed in the other jurisdiction
shall be barred. But this provision shall not apply to criminal proceedings, either under this act or the
criminal law of any State: And provided further, That a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party
aggrieved, or a judgment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution." Id.
' Id. at 4.
92 Id.
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the refusal of a train conductor to allow an African American woman to sit
in the ladies car of a train.93 Because she was travelling with a young white
man the conductor surmised that she was a woman of questionable morals,
though in fact it turned out that the man with whom she was traveling was
her spouse.94
By an eight to one vote, the Supreme Court struck down Sections 1 and 2
of the 1875 Act. 5 Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied solely to racially discriminatory state ac-
tion.9 6 For example, the majority asserted that the Act outlawed the Black
Codes passed following the Civil War to reduce the freed slaves to a condi-
tion indistinguishable from slavery.9 For the majority, the Fourteenth
Amendment's authorized Congress to:
[N]ullif[y] and make[] void all State legislation, and State action of every kind,
which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or
which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or
which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws. 98
The Court contended that the Amendment gave Congress the authority
"To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibit-
ed State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void,
and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and
this is the whole of it."99
The Court viewed racial discrimination practiced by private individuals
as falling outside the scope of Fourteenth Amendment protection. Thus, the
Court asserted:
[S]o in the present case, until some State law has been passed, or some State
action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citi-
zens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the
United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legisla-
tion, can be called into activity: for the prohibitions of the amendment are
against State laws and acts done under State authority. 100
The Court rejected the argument that Congress could preemptively pass
legislation to prevent private individuals from engaging in racial discrimi-
9 Id. at 4-5.
4 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 5.
15 Id. at 26.
16 Id. at 24-25.
9 FONER, supra note 48, at 195-205.
98 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
99 Id. at 10-11.
... Id. at 13.
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nation. The Court perceived the exercise of such governmental power to be
reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment.' The Court offered the
following interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's effect:
That amendment prohibits the States from denying to any person the equal pro-
tection of the laws, and declares that Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of the amendment. The law in question ...
is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct; it takes immediate and ab-
solute possession of the subject of the right of admission to inns, public con-
veyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes and displaces State legisla-
tion on the same subject, or only allows it permissive force. It ignores such
legislation, and assumes that the matter is one that belongs to the domain of na-
tional regulation. Whether it would not have been a more effective protection
of the rights of citizens to have clothed Congress with plenary power over the
whole subject, is not now the question. What we have to decide is, whether
such plenary power has been conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth
Amendment; and, in our judgment, it has not.10 2
As to the Thirteenth Amendment, the majority contended that Congress
did have the authority to pass direct and general legislation to ensure that
slavery ceased to exist in the United States. 3 However, the Court per-
ceived racial discrimination practiced by individuals as not a badge or inci-
dent of slavery. Accordingly, Congress could not prohibit racist acts by pri-
vate individuals. The majority rejected the argument that the Thirteenth
Amendment authorized Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
stating:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to
every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests
he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or
admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or
business. Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as
we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper ac-
commodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them.
If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination, amenable to the prohi-
bitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has full power to afford a rem-
edy under that amendment and in accordance with it. 104
The majority acknowledged that areas existed in which Congress had
[D]irect and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, accompanied
with an express or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the regula-
tion of commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes... In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating
'o' Id. at 14-15.
I0 2 d. at 18-19.
103 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20-21
R4 Id. at 24-25.
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the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of indi-
viduals in respect thereof. 10'
In sum, the Court interpreted both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution so that white persons who owned busi-
nesses open to the general public could practice racial discrimination at
will.
In a thoughtful, detailed and compelling dissent, Justice Harlan argued
that the Thirteenth Amendment conferred power upon Congress to pass leg-
islation outlawing discrimination by private individuals. Harlan argued that
race discrimination by individuals was at the core of the institution of slav-
ery.10 6 Harlan declared that:
[S]ince ... [slavery] rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held
in bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection
against, all discrimination against them, because of their race, in respect of such
civil rights as belong to freemen of other races. Congress, therefore, under its
express power to enforce that amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact
laws to protect that people against the deprivation, because of their race, of any
civil rights granted to other freemen in the same State; and such legislation may
be of a direct and primary character, operating upon States, their officers and
agents, and, also, upon, at least, such individuals and corporations as exercise
public functions and wield power and authority under the State. 107
Harlan stated that private business owners acted in a quasi-public capaci-
ty when they operated railroads, theatres, inns and other commercial enter-
prises opened to the general public.0 8 Accordingly, such individuals were
sufficiently clothed with public authority to be amenable to the Constitu-
tion's prohibition against badges or incidents of slavery like racial discrimi-
nation.
Harlan said both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments applied.
The Fourteenth Amendment applied because a privilege or immunity of cit-
izenship was "exemption from race discrimination in respect of any civil
right belonging to citizens of the white race in the same state. 9
The two Amendments overlapped to some degree, but for Harlan, that
presented no constitutional problem. Harlan noted that in the Slaughter-
house Cases the Court had acknowledged that following the Civil War the
southern state legislatures had passed laws which
105 Id. at 18.
106 Id. at 36-37 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'o The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36.
'08 Id. at 40-41.
..9 Id. at48.
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[I]mposed upon the color race onerous disabilities and burdens; curtailed their
rights in the pursuit of life, liberty and property to such an extent that their
freedom was of little value; forbade them to appear in the towns in any other
character than menial servants; required them to reside on and cultivate the soil,
without the right to purchase or own it; excluded them from many occupations
of gain; and denied them the privilege of giving testimony in the courts where a
white man was a party. 1 0
Harlan argued that such laws were badges or incidents of slavery which
the Thirteenth Amendment could reach even before the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.
Harlan pointed out that in Prigg v. Pennsylvania the Court had created an
implied right of self-help to allow a slaveholder to seize a person whom the
slaveholder asserted was a slave even in the absence of legislation recogniz-
ing such a (slaveholder) right.111 The Prigg Court's manufactured slave-
holder recapture power trumped contrary state law requiring some degree of
due process before a person of color could be spirited from the jurisdiction
and confined until death in bondage. 2 Accordingly, Harlan argued that:
[T]he national legislature may, without transcending the limits of the Constitu-
tion, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship,
what it did, with the sanction of this court, for the protection of slavery and the
rights of the masters of fugitive slaves. If fugitive slave laws.., whereby the
master could seize and recover his fugitive slave, were legitimate exercises of
an implied power to protect and enforce a right recognized by the Constitution,
why shall the hands of Congress be tied, so that -- under an express power ...
it may not, by means of direct legislation, bring the whole power of this nation
to bear upon States and their officers, and upon such individuals and corpora-
tions exercising public functions as assume to abridge, impair, or deny rights
confessedly secured by the supreme law of the land?11 3
Hammering his points, Harlan asserted:
[I] t is for Congress, not the judiciary, to say that legislation is appropriate --
that is -- best adapted to the end to be attained. The judiciary may not, with
safety to our institutions, enter the domain of legislative discretion, and dictate
the means which Congress shall employ in the exercise of its granted powers.
That would be sheer usurpation of the functions of a co-ordinate department,
which, if often repeated, and permanently acquiesced in, would work a radical
change in our system of government. 1 4
"o Id. at 37 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)).
.. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 28-29.
112 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 671-72 (1842).
". The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 52-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114Id. at 51.
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"The sound construction of the Constitution," said Chief Justice Mar-
shall,
must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means
by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will ena-
ble that body to perform the high duties assigned to it in the manner most bene-
ficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution, are constitutional. 15
In concluding his argument, Harlan said that racial segregation in public
places was unlawful.116 Harlan pointed out that on a daily basis, in the Su-
preme Court itself, the general public observed Court proceedings on a non-
segregated basis.
Scarcely a day passes without our seeing in this court-room citizens of the
white and black races sitting side by side, watching the progress of our busi-
ness. It would never occur to any one that the presence of a colored citizen in a
court-house, or court-room, was an invasion of the social rights of white per-
sons who may frequent such places. And yet, such a suggestion would be quite
as sound in law ... as is the suggestion that the claim of a colored citizen to use,
upon the same terms as is permitted to white citizens, the accommodations of
public highways, or public inns, or places of public amusement, established un-
der the license of the law, is an invasion of the social rights of the white race.117
Unfortunately, the majority's miserly interpretation of the scope of Con-
gressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment became embedded in
American constitutional law with disastrous consequences. Perhaps the
most notable example of such erroneous Supreme Court decisions was
Plessy v. Ferguson."'
On the crest of the tide to reverse the national progress made during Re-
construction, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in
Plessy v. Ferguson. Homer Plessy, an African American who according to
court records was seven-eighths white and looked like a white person, was
arrested for riding in the whites only section in a Louisiana railway car.19
At least one account of Plessy's arrest states that Plessy identified himself
".. Id. at 51 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
116/Id. at 59.
"7 Id. at 60.
11 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 546 (1896).
.9 Id. at 538.
20151
482 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVIII:iv
by saying to the streetcar conductor: "I have to tell you that, according to
Louisiana law, I am a colored man."' 20
Plessy filed suit challenging the local segregation statutes. 121 In an eight
to one decision the United States Supreme Court ruled against him.1 22 The
Court held that the state's statutes were not unreasonable.1 23 The Court said
that if the segregation statutes discriminated in a demeaning manner, the
problem was primarily in the minds of African Americans who chose to
look at the statutes in that way. The majority stated:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that con-
struction upon it. l 24
Based on this tortured logic, the Court ruled that the segregation statutes
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause.
In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the real impact of the segregation
statutes was that African Americans were perceived as being so debased
and inferior that they were not free to associate with white citizens:
Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the presence here of eight mil-
lions of blacks. The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly
linked together, and the interests of both require that the common government
of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of
law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and
perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments,
which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was
enacted in Louisiana.'1 25
In addition to discrimination against African-Americans in jury selection,
public accommodations, voting, and education, white individuals attempted
to intimidate African Americans who were exercising their rights to work
and contract. For example, in Hodges v. United States, a mob of white men
in Arkansas marched on a sawmill and drove six African Americans men
off their jobs, thereby preventing the African Americans from exercising
120 HARVEY FIRESIDE, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: HOMER PLESSY AND THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
THAT LEGALIZED RACISM 1 (2004).
121 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 538.
122 Id. at 548-49.
123 Id. at 550-51 (emphasis added).
' 24 Id. at 551.
125 Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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their right to contract with other individuals for gainful employment. 126 The
assailants were convicted under federal statutes protecting African Ameri-
cans from terrorist activities by groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the
Knights of the White Camellias. 121
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the majority of the Court
reversed the lower court's convictions. 128 The Court stated that the Four-
teenth Amendment only applies to discriminatory state action. 129 According
to the majority, the mob behavior was not state action: the mob was a group
of individuals who violated the rights of African Americans.130
Turning to the African Americans workers' argument under the Thir-
teenth Amendment, the Court stated that the Thirteenth Amendment simply
abolished slavery.13 1 According to the Court, the Amendment was not in-
tended to prohibit the type of racially based crimes which defendants com-
mitted in the Hodges case. Relying on this reasoning, the Court held that the
trial court did not have the authority to convict the white assailants under
the civil rights statutes. 13 2
In a strong dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments applied to the situation. The Fourteenth Amendment
applied because it protected African Americans from being assaulted be-
cause of their color.133 Congress could pass legislation to remedy such hate
crimes.134 In addition, Justice Harlan argued that under the Thirteenth
Amendment, one of the incidents of slavery was that African Americans
were unable to contract.135 Accordingly, Congress could legislate to prevent
126 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1906).
127 The Knights of the White Camellia has recently been described as follows: "The Knights of the
White Camellia, a Texas Klan group led by Charles Lee, along with the Texas chapter of Thom Robb's
Knights of the KKK, has been linked to a number of incidents of racial intimidation and harassment in
Vidor, Texas. These incidents, which occurred in 1992 and 1993, involved efforts to prevent the deseg-
regation of an all-white federally assisted housing project in Vidor. Among the reported acts of intimida-
tion was the threat to blow up a housing unit to prevent its integration; residents of the project addition-
ally alleged that the White Camellia Knights carried automatic weapons on a bus they drove through the
housing complex and that one Klan member offered white children $50 to beat up African -American
children. The Texas Commission on Human Rights has brought a civil suit against both Klan groups in
response to these incidents." Anti-Semitism in the United States: Hate Groups, JEWISH VIRTUAL
LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/KKK.html (last visited April 27,
2015).
128 Hodges, 203 U.S. at 20.
129 Id. at 14.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 16.
132 Id. at 19-20.
"33 Hodges, 203 U.S at 28 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 30.
135 Id. at 38.
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private individuals from interfering with African Americans' contract
rights. 3 6 Harlan contended that the vigilantes had forced the African Amer-
icans to violate their employment contracts merely because the African
Americans were African Americans. 137
The Court's decisions in cases like The Civil Rights Cases, Plessy, and
Hodges, all undercut African Americans' attempts to exercise their civil
rights. These and similar Supreme Court decisions demonstrated at least
one thing: regarding the rights of African Americans, instead of its motto of
"Equal justice under law," the Court had effectively posted a large sign:
"Do not disturb!"
C. An Early Twentieth Century Fight for Freedom
Confronted with these daunting constitutional obstacles, twentieth-
century human rights advocates, like Charles Hamilton-Houston, the Vice
Dean of the Howard University School of Law, decided to embark on a sys-
tematic campaign to destroy segregation. In the early 1930s, Houston modi-
fied a proposal by Harvard Law Professor Nathan Margold calling for an
ambitious litigation strategy attacking segregation throughout the south.138
Houston instead chose to initially challenge segregation within the bounds
of the existing law by making local officials live up to the holding that
Plessy dictated--not only separateness, but also equality. Houston argued
that the white governmental officials would recognize that the public could
not afford to maintain equal dual school systems. 13 9 Houston assumed that
such officials would then make the rational decision to desegregate.
An early example of Houston's strategy was Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada.14 In Gaines, a Negro student, Lloyd Gaines, was denied admis-
sion to the all-white University of Missouri Law School. 41 Speaking for a
divided Court, Chief Justice Hughes stated, "it was as an individual that he
was entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and the State was bound to
136 Id. at 27-29.
"' Id. at 23-24.
138 Leland B. Ware, Setting the Stage for Brown: The Development and Implementation of the NAACP's
School Desegregation Campaign, 1930-1950, 52 MERCER L. REV. 631,634-35, 639-42 (2001). GENNA
RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
116-17 (1983).
'3 See id. Ware, supra note 138 at 642; McNeil, supra note 138 at 117..
140 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
141 Id. at 342-44.
MODERN "SAPPERS AND MINERS"
furnish him within its borders facilities for legal education substantially
equal to those ... afforded for persons of the white race. '142
Gaines was the first major NAACP litigation victory at the Supreme
Court level.14 After the case was decided, the plaintiff, Lloyd Gaines, mys-
teriously disappeared and was never seen again.144 While foul play was
never confirmed or denied, it was strongly suspected. 14 5
In the arena of labor law in the early 1940's, the Supreme Court decided
the cases of Steele v. Louisiana and Nashville Railroads and Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers.146 These cases in-
volved the white railroad unions which called themselves Brotherhoods and
which (in an unbrotherly manner) denied membership to African Ameri-
cans. 141 Under the relevant railroad labor legislation, the Brotherhoods were
allowed to be the bargaining agent for the railway workers. 148 Steele and
Tunstall held that the Brotherhoods had to fairly represent non-member Af-
rican Americans. 149
As World War II concluded, it became clear that the separate but equal
litigation was resulting in newer inferior school facilities for African Amer-
icans. For example, some schools had one room used for cafeteria and
gymnasium, or one room used for cafeteria, gymnasium, and the auditori-
um. 150
While progress at the secondary school level was discouraging, the
NAACP won victories in Sipuel v. Oklahoma and McLaurin v. Board of
Regents of Oklahoma. Those cases established the right of African Ameri-
cans at the graduate level to participate more fully in the educational pro-
cess. 151
142 Id. at 351.
141 See Ware, supra note 138, at 658.
"4' Ware, supra note 138, at 658.
4' Robert C. Downs, Harry D. Pener & Steven D. Gilley, A Partial History of UMKC School of Law:
The "'Minority Report", 68 UMKC L. REV. 511,522-23 n.66 (2000).
146 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
4 Steele, 323 U.S. at 194; Tunstall, 323 U.S. at 211-12.
148 Steele, 323 U.S. at 194-95; Tunstall, 323 U.S. at 211-12.
141 Steele, 323 U.S. at 204; Tunstall, 323 U.S. at 212-13.
' See, e.g., Jennifer Drummond, African-American High School's Legacy Lives On, CHESTERFIELD
OBSERVER (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.chesterfieldobserver.com/news/2008-02-27/news/025.html.;
OLIVER W. HILL, THE BIG BANG, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BEYOND: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER W. HILL, SR., 155-56 (2000).
... See generally McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Re-
gents, 332 U.S. 631 (1946).
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The battle for equality under the law had wide ranging implications be-
cause racial discrimination was deeply entrenched in America's social in-
frastructure through laws which appeared neutral but masked rank segrega-
tion. So, for instance, many veterans took advantage of the G.I. Bill to seek
further academic and vocational training. For black GIs who had risked
their lives to "make the world safe for democracy", the doors of segregated
colleges and universities throughout many states remained shut to them. 152
Those same doors swung open widely to welcome returning white GIs.151
Unlike his African American comrades in arms the GI Bill allowed white
service persons like former President George H.W. Bush to attend any col-
lege in the United States. 154
In this way, the national government subsidized a national racial quota
system which gave institutions of higher learning tax payer money to set
aside slots for white World War II and Korean War GIs while refusing to
allow blacks to compete for places in such institutions. 155 Even in elite
schools which were nominally opened to black GIs, unofficial quotas kept
the population of black students (as well as those of other outcasts, like
Jews) at token levels. 156
At the Supreme Court level, the mid-twentieth century witnessed signifi-
cant change. In Sweatt v. Painter, to avoid admitting Heman Sweatt, a qual-
ified African American to the University of Texas Law School, the state of
152 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 256-58 (1976).
'53 Id.; F. Michael Higginbotham, Soldiers for Justice: The Role of the Tuskegee Airmen in the Desegre-
gation of the American Armed Forces, 8 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 273, 286 n. 72 (2000); Anthony
M. Platt, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, 11 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 67, 69
(1997); John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Remaking the Urban University for the Urban Stu-
dent: Talking About Race, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1262 (1998).
'14 See SUZANNE METLLER, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK, HOW THE G.I. BILL BUILT THE MIDDLE
CLASS AND ENHANCED DEMOCRACY 2 (2012); Megan Slack, By the Numbers: 3, THE WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Apr. 27, 2012, 3:34 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04/27/numbers-3; see also
sources cited supra note 153. Similarly, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist benefited from the vet-
erans affirmative action program. See e.g., DONALD E. BOLES, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUDICIAL
ACTIVIST: THE EARLY YEARS 13-14 (1987); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 3-4
(2001). For a revealing behind-the-scenes perspective of the Rehnquist nomination to the Supreme
Court, see JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT
THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2001). See also Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub.
L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284, 287-90.
'.. Jonathan K. Stubbs, Why America Still Needs Affirmative Action, VA. LAWYER, Oct. 2008, at 20.
l56 For discussion of the invidious nature of group based quotas, particularly as applied to Jews, see gen-
erally Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F. 3d 732, 793-94 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting); Karen Sacks,
How Did Jews Become White Folks in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES 395-401 (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, eds. 1997); Marcia Graham Synott, Anti-Semitism and American Universities: Did Quotas
Follow the Jews in ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 233-71 (David A. Gerber, ed. 1986).
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Texas created a law school just for plaintiff.15' The school consisted of a
few rooms in the basement of a storefront building, a sparse library and
three part time instructors. 58 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Vinson
accepted the plaintiff's argument regarding the makeshift law school and
the criteria for a good law school:
Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the original or
the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality in the edu-
cational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the state. In
terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for spe-
cialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law
review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior.
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree, those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement
but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a
few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, posi-
tion and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, tradition and
prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these
law schools would consider the question close. 159
After Sweatt, the Court appeared poised to overturn segregation per se.
In June 1950, less than a month after the Court decided Sweatt, at its an-
nual convention, the NAACP decided to challenge segregation head on. 161
Four cases were filed in relatively short order, culminating in the decision
in Brown.
In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court ruled that
legally required racial segregation of public schools was unconstitutional
because such segregation deprived students of color of equal educational
opportunities.1 61 The Court unanimously held that the segregated schools
were inherently unequal.1 62 The rationale which outlawed segregation in
Brown was extended to a number of other areas, and laid the foundation to
further dismantle American apartheid.
In these historical circumstances, as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
moving through Congress, an important issue was whether to push the
151 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
158 CHARLES ZELDEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A MORE
PERFECT UNION 56 (2013); JACK GREENBERG, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: WITNESS TO A
LANDMARK DECISION, 22 (2004).
15 339 U.S. at 633-34.
161 Smithsonian National Museum of American History, Separate is Not Equal: Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/3-organized/turning-point.html (last visited April 27,
2015).
161 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
162 Id.
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Court to revisit and substantially narrow or overrule the 1883 decision in
The Civil Rights Cases or to try a different route.
Rather than tackle The Civil Rights Cases and its progeny, the Com-
merce Clause seemed an easier path.
D. The Commerce Clause Path
Since the late 1930s, the Court had taken an extremely deferential ap-
proach to reviewing Congress's decisions based on the Commerce Clause.
For example, in United States v. Darby, the Court upheld the authority of
Congress to enact provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act which prohib-
ited the interstate shipment of goods produced by employees whose wages
and hours failed to conform to the requirements of the Act. 163 Citing Gib-
bons v. Ogden, the Darby Court reaffirmed that Congress had power over
commerce that was "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost ex-
tent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Con-
stitution. -16' Accordingly, Congress had the authority to outlaw a Georgia
manufacturer's use of interstate commerce to sell lumber products produced
by employees in violation of minimum wage and hour standards.
Similarly, in Wickard v. Filburn, the Court sustained congressional legis-
lation which provided that a penalty could be imposed on wheat farmers
who exceeded their individual quotas for the production of wheat even if
the excess wheat was being raised for the farmer's personal consumption
rather than for interstate sale. 165 The Court upheld a penalty of $117.11
against a farmer who raised two hundred and thirty nine bushels more than
his allotment. 166 The Court stated "[t]hat the appellee's own contribution to
the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. 16
In identifying the constitutional bedrock underlying the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Court's expansive interpretation of Congress's Commerce
Clause power offered a convivial constitutional foundation for the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. In contrast, in The Civil Rights Cases, the Court had
strait-jacketed the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. In this histori-
163 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
'" Id. at 114 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824)).
165 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
166 Id. at 114-15
67 Id. at 127-28.
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cal context, the proponents of the Act choice of the commerce clause as the
primary constitutional foundation proved propitious. Shortly after the legis-
lation was enacted, in two cases decided on the same day the Court unani-
mously sustained the Act largely based on Congress' commerce clause
power.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the hotel practiced racial dis-
crimination by refusing to rent rooms to African Americans and sought to
continue its racist practices. 16' The hotel filed a declaratory judgment action
asking that the Court hold that Title Two of the Act exceeded Congress au-
thority under the Commerce Clause. 169
The Court unanimously rejected the hotel's argument and upheld Title
Two of the Act based on Congress' commerce power."'0 The Court said that
the decision in the Civil Rights Cases was inapposite because the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 "broadly proscribed discrimination in 'inns, public con-
veyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement,'
without limiting the categories of affected businesses to those impinging
upon interstate commerce.' 1 1 The Heart of Atlanta Court also emphasized
that in The Civil Rights Cases neither the federal government nor the Court
focused on the Commerce Clause.
In contrast, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relied on the commerce power
and was based on a record that was "filled with testimony of obstructions
and restraints resulting from the discriminations found to be existing. 1 72 In
upholding Title Two of the 1964 Act, the Court pointed out that even as-
suming that the activities of the hotel were "local," "if it is interstate com-
merce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which
applies the squeeze."1 73
Likewise in Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court upheld Title Two against
the claim of a family owned barbecue restaurant which wished to continue
its policy of racial discrimination. The Court said:
[T]he volume of food purchased by Ollie's Barbecue from sources supplied
from out of state was insignificant when compared with the total foodstuffs
moving in commerce. But as our late Brother Jackson said ... in Wickard...
"That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by it-
168 379 U.S. 241,243 (1964).
169 Id. at 242-43.
... Id. at 243.
11 Id. at 250.
172 Id. at 252.
"' Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258 (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n.,
336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
20151
490 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVIII:iv
self is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situat-
ed, is far from trivial. 17 4
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress had Commerce Clause
authority to enact the legislation.
Moreover, the Court stated that under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Congress has authority to enact legislation that affected local activities
where those local activities impacted interstate commerce. The McClung
Court put matters this way:
Much is said about a restaurant business being local but "even if appellee's ac-
tivity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce .... ,175 The activities that are beyond the reach
of Congress are "those which are completely within a particular State, which do
not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the
purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government." 176
In sum, the McClung Court stated: "This rule is as good today as it was
when Chief Justice Marshall laid it down almost a century and a half
ago."1
More recent Supreme Court cases suggest that a current majority of the
Court may not share the McClung Court's perspective on the scope of Con-
gress' commerce power.
I1. A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: A
TROUBLING TRIO
Three notable relatively recent Supreme Court cases that have curbed
Congress' commerce authority are United States v. Lopez, 8 United States
v. Morrison 179 and the ACA case.8 0
Lopez involved a twelfth grade student who was arrested for carrying a
concealed revolver and bullets to school.81 He was subsequently convicted
under the Gun Free Zones Act which made it a federal crime to knowingly
17' Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964).
175 Id. at 302 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
176 Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824)).
177 Id.
178 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
179 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
0 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
1 1 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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possess a firearm in a school zone.18 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the conviction, 3 and the Supreme Court upheld the Fifth
Circuit's decision.
Writing for a narrow majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence had established that Congress'
power was limited to regulating three broad categories. First, Congress
could manage "the use of the channels of interstate commerce." '"14 Second,
Congress had authority over the "instrumentalities of commerce." 8 5 Final-
ly, Congress could control "activities having a substantial relation to inter-
state commerce. 1 8 6
The Court held that the Gun Free Zones Act was not a regulation of ac-
tivities substantially related to interstate commerce. The Court contended
that:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
"commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might de-
fine those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our
cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with
a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce. 187
One might ask why is it not a legislative function to decide which statute
(like section 922(q) is (or is not) "essential" to achieve the legislature's
goals? In fact, in his Civil Rights Cases dissent, Justice Harlan made essen-
tially the same point:
The judiciary may not, with safety to our institutions, enter the domain of legis-
lative discretion, and dictate the means which Congress shall employ in the ex-
ercise of its granted powers. That would be sheer usurpation of the functions of
a co-ordinate department, which, if often repeated, and permanently acquiesced
in, would work a radical change in our system of government .188
Be that as it may, the Lopez Court concluded that "[t]he possession of a
gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might,
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate
182 Id.
183 Id. at 552.
114 Id. at 558.
185 Id.
186 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
Is? Id. at 561.
188 109 U.S. at51.
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commerce." '19 The Court expressed fear that the national government was
seeking to assert a general police power inconsistent with state sovereignty
under the Tenth Amendment.19
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that a rational basis existed for Con-
gress' enactment of the legislation, and that the Court should defer to Con-
gress' judgment.191 Specifically the dissenters asserted that a factual basis
existed for Congress to believe that gun violence in schools adversely af-
fected education.192 "Having found that guns in schools significantly un-
dermine the quality of education in our Nation's classrooms, Congress
could also have found, given the effect of education upon interstate and for-
eign commerce, that gun-related violence in and around schools is a com-
mercial, as well as human problem." '193 In short, Congress had sufficient
reason to pass the legislation, and the Court should have sustained rather
than overruled the legislature on a matter of public policy.
In United States v. Morrison, the Court struck down Section 13981 of the
Violence Against Women Act,1 94 which provided a civil remedy for victims
of gender based violence.1 95 The Court held that the Constitution did not au-
thorize Congress to pass such legislation either under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment or under Congress' commerce power.1 96 Relying upon
its reasoning in Lopez, the Morrison Court said:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, eco-
nomic activity. While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating
the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far
in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature. 197
Even though Congress made extensive findings regarding the impact of
gender violence on victims, the Court asserted that it, not Congress, was the
final arbiter of whether the particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. 9 The Court "reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regu-
late noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's
'"9 Id. at 567.
...Id. at 564.
'.' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192 Id.
19' Id. at 620.
'9 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 619, 627.
" Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
19' Id. at 614.
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aggregate effect on interstate commerce." '199 The Court reasserted its fear
that Congress was attempting to create an unconstitutional national police
power which would destroy state sovereignty over many matters which tra-
ditionally fall within the state police power.20 0
The Morrison Court also held that Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not save the gender based violence statute because Section
Five applied to state action rather than that of individuals. 201 The Court en-
dorsed The Civil Rights Cases' narrow interpretation of the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Writing for himself and three other Justices, Justice Souter dissented.
Souter claimed that Congress had made sufficient findings of the economic
impact of domestic violence to sustain the Act under its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.2 2 His dissent pointed out that the evidence supporting the
gender based violence act was more voluminous than that which was used
to sustain the Civil Rights Act of 1964.203 Souter's dissent did not address
The Civil Rights Cases.
More recently, in the ACA case, the Court ruled that Congress had power
under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution to pass the indi-
vidual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act. 204 The individual
mandate required certain classes of individuals to purchase health insurance
with prescribed features or pay a penalty.20 5
Nevertheless, a bare majority of the Court also asserted that the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution did not confer upon Congress the authori-
ty to enact the individual mandate legislation. Writing for himself, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that the Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause
as giving Congress wide latitude in enacting legislation to regulate inter-
state commerce:
[J]it is now well established that Congress has broad authority under the Clause.
We have recognized, for example, that " [t]he power of Congress over interstate
commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states," but
extends to activities that "have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."...
Congress's power, moreover, is not limited to regulation of an activity that by
... Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.211 Id. at 615.
201 Id. at 621 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
202 Id. at 628-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 635-36.
204 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2573-74 (2012).
205 Id.
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itself substantially affects interstate commerce, but also extends to activities
that do so only when aggregated with similar activities of others.20 6
However, having established the wide swath of congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause, Roberts contended that the Court had never-
theless confined the boundaries of that authority to cases in which Congress
was attempting to regulate the activities of individuals. "As expansive as
our cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they all
have one thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching
'activity.' It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting them.12 1
The Chief Justice then concluded that Congress lacked the authority to
establish the individual mandate because the Chief Justice perceived the in-
dividual mandate as a congressional "command" that individuals engage in
commercial activity - specifically, that they buy health insurance poli-
208cies.
To support his argument, the Chief Justice cited and distinguished Wick-
ard v. Filburn. Roberts described Wickard as a case in which the wheat
farmers were engaged in commercial activity (farming) and therefore, Con-
gress could regulate that activity as part of a broad national policy. 2 9 The
Chief Justice contended that Congress was claiming a power to "command
that those not buying wheat do so... [as well as to] command that those not
buying health insurance do so. ' 210
In contrast, in the Sebelius decision, Roberts claimed that individuals
who had not purchased health insurance had refrained from commercial ac-
tivity and were therefore "doing nothing" 211. Roberts argued that the gov-
ernment could not compel private individuals who were uninvolved in
commerce to become commercially active. He opined:
[M]ost of those regulated by the individual mandate are not currently engaged
in any commercial activity involving health care, and that fact is fatal to the
Government's effort to "regulate the uninsured as a class." ... Our precedents
recognize Congress's power to regulate "class[es] of activities," ... not classes
of individuals, apart from any activity in which they are engaged. 212
206 Id. at 2585-86.
207 Id. at 2587.
208 Id.
209 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
210 Id. at 2588.
211 Id. at 2589.
212 Id. at 2590.
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Since, those who had not chosen to obtain insurance coverage were ac-
cording to Roberts not involved in activity, Congress could not compel
them to become commercial actors.213
People, for reasons of their own, often fail to do things that would be good for
them or good for society. Those failures, joined with the similar failures of oth-
ers, can readily have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Under the
Government's logic, that authorizes Congress to use its commerce power to
compel citizens to act as the Government would have them act.214
However, Roberts went on to find that the individual mandate was a tax
within the scope of Congress' taxing and spending authority.2 15 On that ba-
sis, he along with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan voted to
sustain the individual mandate.2 6 Writing for the Court, Roberts held that:
"The Affordable Care Act's requirement that certain individuals pay a fi-
nancial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be char-
acterized as a tax. Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our
role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness. 21
In a joint opinion, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito dissented
from the Court's decision that the individual mandate was constitutional
because it was a tax. The dissenters pointed out that the statute described
the mandate as a penalty, and that the Court had established that a tax and a
penalty are not synonymous.2 8
Our cases establish a clear line between a tax and a penalty: "[A] tax is an en-
forced contribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty ... is
an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act." ... In a few
cases, this Court has held that a "tax" imposed upon private conduct was so on-
erous as to be in effect a penalty. But we have never held--never--that a penalty
imposed for violation of the law was so trivial as to be in effect a tax. We have
never held that any exaction imposed for violation of the law is an exercise of
Congress' taxing power--even when the statute calls it a tax, much less when
(as here) the statute repeatedly calls it a penalty. When an act "adopt[s] the cri-
teria of wrongdoing" and then imposes a monetary penalty as the "principal
consequence on those who transgress its standard," it creates a regulatory pen-
alty, not a tax. 219
213 Id. at 2589.
214 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2589.
215 Id. at 2600.
216 Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part).
217 Id. at 2600 (majority opinion).
218 Id. at 2651 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting).
219 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2651-52.
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However, regarding the boundaries of Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause, the dissenters were in substantial agreement with Chief
Justice Roberts. The dissenters said that:
[I]f that provision [the individual mandate] regulates anything, it is the failure
to maintain minimum essential coverage. One might argue that it regulates that
failure by requiring it to be accompanied by payment of a penalty. But that
failure--that abstention from commerce--is not "Commerce." To be sure, pur-
chasing insurance is "Commerce"; but one does not regulate commerce that
does not exist by compelling its existence.2 20
Rather ominously, the joint dissenters described Wickard v. Filburn in
the following language: "The striking case of Wickard v. Filburn, held that
the economic activity of growing wheat, even for one's own consumption,
affected commerce sufficiently that it could be regulated, always has been
regarded as the ne plus ultra of expansive Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. 221 Calling Wickard an extreme case is hardly a ringing endorsement
affirming its continuing validity.
Indeed Chief Justice Roberts uses similar language when he depicts
Wickard as one in which the commerce power "has been held to authorize
federal regulation of such seemingly local matters as a farmer's decision to
grow wheat for himself and his livestock. 222 By pointing out that the pro
duction of wheat for personal consumption seems to be a local matter, Rob-
erts (not too subtly) indicated his skepticism regarding the Wickard deci-
sion's conclusion that such individual activity was sufficient to fall within
Congress' commerce power. Roberts' opinion suggests that, like the dis-
senters, he views Wickard as a borderline case:
Wickard has long been regarded as "perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity," ...but the Government's
theory in his case would go much further. Under Wickard it is within Con-
gress's power to regulate the market for wheat by supporting its price. But price
can be supported by increasing demand as well as by decreasing supply. The
aggregated decisions of some consumers not to purchase wheat have a substan-
tial effect on the price of wheat, just as decisions not to purchase health insur-
ance have on the price of insurance. Congress can therefore command that
those not buying wheat do so, just as it argues here that it may command that
those not buying health insurance do so. The farmer in Wickard was at least ac-
tively engaged in the production of wheat, and the Government could regulate
that activity because of its effect on commerce. The Government's theory here
would effectively override that limitation, by establishing that individuals may
220 Id. at 2644.
221 Id. at 2643 (citations omitted).
222 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578-79 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
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be regulated under the Commerce Clause whenever enough of them are not do-
ing something the Government would have them do.223
The Chief Justice affirmed the substance of the dissent's commerce
clause argument by saying: "The commerce power thus does not authorize
the mandate. Accord ... (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting). 224 In short, it seems that five justices now agree on a
much more restrictive reading of the commerce clause than had previously
been true.
In a thought provoking dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg, argued that
the contentions of the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
and Alito joint opinion radically departed from the Court's prior Commerce
Clause analysis. Ginsburg stated that:
Until today, this Court's pragmatic approach to judging whether Congress val-
idly exercised its commerce power was guided by two familiar principles. First,
Congress has the power to regulate economic activities "that substantially af-
fect interstate commerce."... Second, we owe a large measure of respect to
Congress when it frames and enacts economic and social legislation.225
Applying those criteria to the ACA case lead Justice Ginsburg to con-
clude that "[T]hese principles ... require the Court to hold that the minimum
coverage provision is proper Commerce Clause legislation. Beyond dispute,
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the uninsured, as a class,
substantially affect interstate commerce. "226
Ginsburg agreed with the Chief Justice's holding that Congress had pow-
er to mandate that individuals buy health insurance under Congress' power
to levy taxes. Nevertheless, Ginsburg found it puzzling that the Chief Jus-
tice would attempt to impose significant restrictions on Congress commerce
power. "Why should The Chief Justice strive so mightily to hem in Con-
gress' capacity to meet the new problems arising constantly in our everde-
veloping modem economy ?'221 In other words, why write a long judicial
essay on the Commerce Clause when your analysis of that Clause is not
necessary to decide the case? As Justice Ginsburg noted, "I see no reason
to undertake a Commerce Clause analysis that is not outcome determina-
tive." 228
223 Id. at 2588.
224 Id. (citations omitted).
225 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dis-
senting in part).
226 Id. at 2617.
2 27 Id. at 2629.
228 Id. at 2629 n.12.
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Justice Ginsburg's question may be restated: "In attempting to tie Con-
gress' hands under the Commerce Clause, what are the other five Justices
up to?" That question is briefly explored in the concluding section which
follows.
CONCLUSION: PRELIMINARY PARANOIA?
From the standpoint of the protection of human rights under the Consti-
tution, one must ask the question, just what does the narrow reading of the
Commerce Clause in cases like Lopez, Morrison and the ACA case mean?
After all, Title Two and Title Seven of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
largely based on Congress plenary power to regulate commerce. The Court
has previously repeated that Congress has broad commerce power. Now
one wonders. In the first Title II cases (Heart of Atlanta Hotel and
McClung), the Court unanimously upheld the Civil Rights Act based on the
Commerce Clause. After the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts manhandling of
Congress' commerce power, how far are these two seminal Title II cases
unscathed?
One could be forgiven for the fleeting thought that the Roberts Court is
erecting a devastating constitutional mine field to obliterate the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 which protects all persons in the United States from in-
vidious discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or national
origin. Or put another way, the Court's Sebelius decision reflects a kind of
termite jurisprudential approach. The Court is hollowing the substance of
constitutional protections into an empty shell by erroneous interpretations
of the spirit and letter of our guardian of liberty: the Constitution.
